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Abstract 
 
This study explores the EU’s role in reaching the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with 
Iran on 14 July 2015. More specifically, the paper examines the validity of a statement made by High 
Representative Federica Mogherini, which suggests that it “mainly” was due to the EU that it was 
possible to settle the historic nuclear deal. This topic is particularly interesting because most recent 
studies have focused on the provisions of the JCPOA and its geostrategic impact rather than the po-
litical process behind the deal. In particular, the last stage of negotiations from November 2013 – July 
2015 is under-investigated. The paper hypothesizes that the EU managed to sustain dialogue and 
initiate the major diplomatic breakthroughs. However, the paper finds that the Europeans did not 
provide the main impetus to reach the deal. Nevertheless, the EU played an important role in a prom-
ising negotiating format that perhaps can be applied to other cases in the future.     
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1. Setting the scene  
 
Yesterday the European Union wrote one of the best pages of its history: the Iranian nuclear 
deal has been reached thanks to the facilitation of the EU. It has been a difficult, complex, 
long process. What we have achieved is the result of the strong political will of all parties, 
and the combined commitment of many. But it is mainly thanks to the extraordinary work 
of an extraordinary team, the European one, that we made it. 
EU High Representative Federica Mogherini1 
 
On 14 July 2015 the EU’s High Representative Federica Mogherini presented a groundbreaking nu-
clear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, hereafter JCPOA) between Iran and the international 
community. As a case of diplomacy at the highest level, the Iran negotiations had become a matter of 
more than conflict resolution in itself; it was a fundamental test of the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.2 Nevertheless, it remains unclear how much added value the EU managed to bring 
into the process. The statement above was published on the EEAS’ website the day after the JCPOA 
had been signed, and the formulation is striking. According to Mogherini, it was “mainly” because 
of “the extraordinary work” of the European team that the parties made it in the end. This statement 
suggests that the EU’s role not merely was positive and constructive but even indispensable. Thus, 
this study will put Mogherini’s claim to the test through the following research question:“Was it 
mainly due to the EU’s efforts that it was possible to reach the JCPOA?”   
The topic is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it is a rare case of the EU engaging in security 
policy at the highest international level. Secondly, the close cooperation with the United Nations 
Security Council (hereafter UNSC) led to a double representation of the EU. After all, two of its 
members (France and the UK) hold permanent seats in the UNSC. It is interesting to examine what 
impact this special dynamic had on the diplomatic process. Thirdly, most publications since fall 2015 
                                                          
1 F. Mogherini cited in Mogherini proud of EU contribution to Iranian deal, EEAS, 15 July 2015, retrieved 15 February 
2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2015/150715_iran-deal_en.htm  
2 S. Everts, ‘Engaging Iran: A test case for EU foreign policy’, Centre for European Reform: Working paper, March 2004. 
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have focused on the provisions of the JCPOA and its wider geostrategic implications rather than the 
political path leading to the compromise. The last stage of the so-called ‘E3+3’ talks (comprising 
Iran, the EU, France, the U.K., Germany, the U.S., Russia and China) from 2013 until July 2015, is 
particularly under-investigated. For these reasons, there is a clear need to conduct research that takes 
the full course of the negotiations from 2003-2015 into account in order to assess the diplomatic 
performance of the European Union. 
The paper will proceed in seven parts. Part 1 will establish a hypothesis. Part 2 will 
present the methodology. Parts 3-6 will analyze the diplomatic process distinguishing between the 
periods 2003-2006, 2006-2008, 2008-2012 and 2012-2015. Finally, part 7 will evaluate the EU’s 
influence on reaching the JCPOA.  
 
1.1. Establishing the hypothesis: The EU as a diplomatic actor 
Already in the early 1970’s François Duchêne stated that Europe was “long on eco-
nomic power and relatively short on armed forces”.3 Ian Manners (2002) took this perspective one 
step further by claiming that the EU is a ‘normative power’ that often weighs respect for universal 
values over potential military and financial gains.4 Along somewhat similar lines, Joseph Nye has 
characterized the EU as a major ‘soft power’, owing to its multiple sources of attraction such as 
                                                          
3 F. Duchêne, ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence’, in: M. Kohnstamm & W. Hager 
(eds.), A Nation Writ Large?: Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 1973, p. 19, cited in I. Manners, ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, p. 236.  
4 I. Manners, ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 
2002, pp. 235-258. 
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science, culture and high living standards. Furthermore, it has a positive external image as a success-
ful political entity united through peaceful means.5 Allegedly, these things give the EU legitimacy 
and credibility as a “positive force for solving global problems”.6   
Similar views are reflected in official EU documents. For example, in 2003, the Euro-
pean Council adopted a security strategy entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’. This document 
emphasized the EU’s commitment to address problems within a multilateral framework and to bring 
isolated states back into the international community.7 It also stressed the need to develop a strategic 
culture.8 To this end, cooperation with the UN was described as a cornerstone in responding to secu-
rity issues, of which “proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is potentially the greatest threat”.9 
Thus, it appears that the EU attaches much importance to diplomacy and peaceful conflict resolution. 
This leads me to hypothesize that, 
“By acting as an effective diplomatic actor, the EU was able to sustain dialogue and 
initiate the most significant breakthroughs in the process of reaching an agreement 
with Iran.” 
2. Methodology 
In order to investigate whether it “mainly”10 was due to the EU that it was possible to reach the 
JCPOA, it is necessary to operationalize the word ‘mainly’. This word implies that the EU managed 
to sustain dialogue and initiate the major diplomatic breakthroughs towards the JCPOA.  
                                                          
5 J. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Public Affairs, 2002, pp. 75-83. 
6 Ibid., p. 78. 
7 The European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 10. 
8 Ibid., p. 11. 
9 Ibid., p. 3.  
10 F. Mogherini, loc. cit.   
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The hypothesis assumes that it was because of the EU’s willingness and ability to act 
as an ‘effective’ diplomatic actor that it was capable of playing a key role in the processes. ‘Diplo-
matic effectiveness’ will be operationalized with the four indicators ‘context’, ‘strategy’, ‘leverage’ 
and ‘coherence’. ‘Major diplomatic breakthroughs’ are to be understood as critical junctures provid-
ing new impetus for diplomatic efforts to reach an agreement.  
‘The EU’ is operationalized as the team led by the High Representative and the so-
called ‘E3 group’ encompassing France, the UK and Germany. From October 2003 to September 
2004, the E3 acted on behalf of the EU. After this point, the High Representative joined the E3 in 
order to create a direct link with the remaining member states. It thereby became an ‘EU-3’ format. 
The paper seeks to assess what impact the independent variable ‘EU engagement’, mod-
erated by ‘diplomatic effectiveness’, had on the dependent variables ‘sustaining dialogue’ and ‘reach-
ing the JCPOA’. To this end, the study employs a process-tracing approach based some assumed 
central indicators of effective diplomatic engagement. The analysis will examine variations for the 
mentioned variables in the periods 2003-2006, 2006-2008, 2008-2012 and 2012-2015. The empirical 
basis of the thesis encompasses a wide range of sources including expert interviews, books, newspa-
pers, academic journals, online articles and, to a wide extent, WikiLeaks documents. 
The first indicator is ‘context’. In this paper it refers to the historical, political and eco-
nomic circumstances, at domestic and international level, which surround a diplomatic crisis. 
Changes in these broad background factors may either open or close windows of opportunity for 
bringing diplomatic engagement forward. Specific examples are domestic political games, elections 
and economic crises. 
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‘Coherence’ is the second indicator. It refers to the level of “co-ordination and substan-
tive agreement between individual Member States’ policies towards a conflict” and towards engage-
ment carried out by the EU institutions.11 When the EU acts with a high degree of unity, it is difficult 
for other parties to exploit the different national interests among the 28 member states. This gives 
weight behind the EU’s diplomatic tactics. Conversely, disunity reduces the credibility and presum-
ably the effectiveness of the EU’s diplomatic engagement.12  
The third indicator of diplomatic effectiveness is ‘strategy’. As illustrated by table 1, 
the study will distinguish between four ideal types of strategies derived from Bergmann and Niemann 
(2015)13 and the EU’s Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities.14 Moving 
from left to right in the typology, actions become increasingly direct and demanding, thus requiring 
bigger commitments from the engaged actor. It is important to note that the categories often overlap 
in practice.  
Table 1: Strategies of engagement   
Sources: Based on Bergmann & Niemann (2015) and Council of the European Union, Concept on Strengthening EU 
Mediation and Dialogue Capacities (2009).  
                                                          
11 J. Bergmann & A. Niemann, ‘Mediating International Conﬂicts: The European Union as an Effective Peacemaker?’ 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 53, no. 5, 2015, pp. 962-963. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Council of the European Union, Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities, Brussels, 15779/09, 
10 November 2009, p. 2.    
Engagement intensity            Less intense                                         More intense 
Strategy Dialogue Facilitation Formulation   Manipulation 
Actor role 
To engage in 
an open-ended 
process which 
aims to estab-
lish a culture 
of communi-
cation that 
may serve to 
prevent or ease 
conflicts. 
To act as chan-
nel of commu-
nication be-
tween dispu-
tants. The fa-
cilitator may 
also assist in 
defining dead-
lines and 
benchmarks.     
To mediate by 
formulating 
compromise 
proposals or to 
engage as a ne-
gotiator seeking 
to advance own 
interests.  
 
 
 
To employ positive or 
negative conditionality 
as a means to alter the 
cost-benefit calculations 
of one or more actors. 
E.g. to issue trade pref-
erences in return for ne-
gotiating concessions or 
to punish non-compli-
ance with sanctions. 
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The fourth indicator is ‘leverage’. The Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and 
Dialogue Capacities states that “given its political weight and financial resources, the EU can, as 
appropriate, provide diplomatic leverage (e.g. as part of a group of friends) and/or economic credence 
to mediation processes”.15 On a practical level, ‘issue linkage’ is a means to translate political weight 
and economic resources into leverage. For instance, actor A may offer benefits in one or more do-
mains, such as trade and visa facilitation, in return for actor B’s concessions on an unrelated issue 
such a non-proliferation. In this way, issue-linkage may alter B’s cost-benefit calculations and make 
B more inclined to cooperate.  
3. 2002-2006: The breakdown of ‘constructive dialogue’ 
Most of this period was marked by diverging transatlantic positions towards Iran which 
were influenced by the context of the war in Iraq. While the U.S. preferred to have the nuclear case 
referred to the UNSC, the EU sought Iranian cooperation through its already-existing ‘constructive 
dialogue’ with the country. However, the effort to foster compliance through positive incentives even-
tually broke down for various reasons. Firstly, the EU struggled to find carrots that would provide 
enough leverage to persuade Iran into lasting cooperation. Secondly, Tehran firmly held that it had a 
legitimate right to develop a nuclear programme for peaceful purposes under the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT). Thirdly, the victory of Mahmoud Ahmajinedad in the 2005 Presidential election of 
Iran lowered the prospect of reconciliation.   
 
 
  
                                                          
15 Council of the European Union, loc. cit. 
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3.1 Context 
On 15 August 2002, the exiled opposition group The National Council of Resistance of 
Iran exposed the construction of two top-secret Iranian nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak.16 For-
mally, Iran did have a right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the NPT. However, 
the secrecy surrounding the building activity and the subsequent postponement of an inspection by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) raised doubts about the regime´s intentions.  
In June 2003, the IAEA concluded that Iran had failed to meet its obligation of reporting 
nuclear material, its use and the facilities where it was stored and processed.17 In response, Iran agreed 
to modify its ‘Safeguards Agreement’ with the IAEA. This meant that any plans to construct nuclear 
facilities in the future would have to be declared immediately.18 However, this was not enough to 
calm decision-makers in Washington and several EU member states.  
The revelation of the nuclear facilities came a few months after President Bush’s infa-
mous State of the Union speech in which he had described Iran as belonging to an “axis of evil”.19 
The prospects of reconciliation did not improve as intelligence suggested that Iran had allowed Al-
Qaeda members to enter its territory.20 Although Iran offered a grand bargain involving full cooper-
ation with the IAEA and support for regional stabilization, the Bush administration turned down the 
offer.21  
                                                          
16 A. Jafarzadeh, Remarks by Alireza Jafarzadeh on New Information on Top Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime’s 
Nuclear Program, Iran Watch, 14 August 2002, retrieved 20 February 2016, http://www.iranwatch.org/library/ncri-new-
information-top-secret-nuclear-projects-8-14-02  
17 International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by Director General, GOV/2003/40, 6 June 2013, p. 2.    
18 Ibid. p. 4. 
19 G. W. Bush, Bush State of the Union address, CNN, 29 January 2002, retrieved 8 April 2016, http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/  
20 J. Muir, Analysis: Iran-US rift widens, BBC, 25 May 2003, retrieved 10 April 2016, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/mid-
dle_east/2936016.stm  
21 B. Kaussler, Iran’s nuclear diplomacy: Power politics and conflict resolution, Oxon, Routledge, 2014, pp. 23-24. 
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Under American pressure, the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) adopted a resolution 
on 12 September 2003. It stopped short of referring Iran to the UNSC but demanded full compliance 
with the Safeguards Agreement. This implied that all past and future imports related to enrichment 
activities had to be declared. Furthermore, Iran had to provide all necessary information, accept un-
restricted access for inspectors, and implement the ‘Additional Protocol’ that increases obligations to 
provide information and access for the IAEA.22  
However, Iran’s credibility was about to be undermined even further. Samples from the 
Natanz facility revealed traces of highly enriched uranium (HEU) that may be used in nuclear weap-
ons.23 The Iranians argued that this was due to contaminated imported centrifuge components.24 How-
ever, despite the risk of being referred to the UNSC, Tehran was not prepared to fulfill the BOG’s 
demands unconditionally.  
At home, the Reformist government faced a political crisis as many Iranians had be-
come frustrated with its failure to deliver domestic reforms. This resulted in a low turnout at the 2003 
local-council elections.25 Hard-pressed by conservative forces, the government desperately needed a 
way to save face in the nuclear negotiations.26 The EU attempted to persuade Tehran with incentive 
packages but failed to satisfy the Iranian decision-makers. In the end, voter apathy and the disquali-
                                                          
22 International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution adopted by the Board on 12 September 2003, GOV/2003/69, 12 September 2003, 
pp. 2-3. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid. 
25 The Economist, Dark Days for the Reformists, 10 February 2004, retrieved 12 October 2017, http://www.econo-
mist.com/node/2421331  
26 Kaussler, op. cit., p. 33. 
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fication of more than 3,500 Reformists candidates helped the conservative hardliner Mahmoud Ah-
madinejad win the Presidential elections in June 2005.27 This severely complicated the prospects of 
finding a solution to the nuclear crisis. 
3.2 Coherence 
A few days before the BOG meeting in September 2003, Dutch non-proliferation chief 
Paul Wilke claimed that there was “no unity within the EU on Iran”, and that even if Iran had nuclear 
weapons, Germany might not perceive it as a threat.28 In addition, economic interests were likely to 
influence Italy’s position, while France probably would support a “quiet approach”.29 These divisions 
threatened to undermine the EU’s principle of consensus at a time when the war in Iraq had led to 
frictions within the Union.   
It was against this background that France, Germany and the UK surprisingly an-
nounced a joint diplomatic effort to prevent the situation from getting out of hand. Thus, on 23 Octo-
ber 2003, the E3’s foreign ministers went to Tehran upon an invitation from the Iranian government. 
This visit led to the signing of the Tehran Declaration. In this document, Iran committed to imple-
menting the Additional Protocol and to settling all outstanding issues with the IAEA. In return, the 
E3 recognized Iran’s right to “to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty”.30 
Although the EU members generally supported the diplomatic outreach to Iran, the E3 
initiative was highly controversial for reasons of principle. Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio told 
                                                          
27 Ibid. p. 29.  
28 Wikileaks, 03THEHAGUE2220, 4 September 2003, retrieved 10 April 2016, http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 
03THEHAGUE2220_a.html 
29 Wikileaks, 03THEHAGUE2173, 28 August 2003, retrieved 10 April 2016, http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 
03THEHAGUE2173_a.html 
30 BBC, Full text: Iran declaration, 21 October 2003, retrieved 11 April 2016, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/ 
3211036.stm  
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U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton that Poland and her country would “stand firm” against this 
“directoire of three”. In her view, the E3 was a non-existent group without any right to stamp agree-
ments on behalf of the EU.31 According to a later cable from Bolton, the Italians also expressed “dis-
pleasure over ‘EU Three’ attempts to arrogate EU policy on this issue”.32 A Dutch official described 
the E3 as being very secretive in their dealings with Iran and wondered if the group was struggling to 
find an internal consensus.33  
Nevertheless, in September 2004, the member states decided to reaffirm their consent 
to the E3’s lead. The precondition was that EU High Representative Javier Solana would take part in 
the negotiations. By placing the initiative more squarely under the EU’s Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy, the E3 sought to increase its legitimacy within the Union.34 Thus, Solana would effec-
tively act as bridge between the E3 and the rest of the EU members. It thereby became an ‘EU-3’ 
constellation.35  
3.3 Strategy and leverage  
The EU-3 used its already-existing ‘Constructive Dialogue’ with Iran to leverage its 
diplomatic outreach. By linking this dialogue with the nuclear issue, they sought to persuade Iran into 
compliance. Thus, the Europeans made clear to Iran that further negotiations on a possible Trade and 
                                                          
31 A. Palacio cited in Wikileaks, 03ROME4585, 7 October 2003, retrieved 10 April 2016, http://wikileaks.org/plusd/ca-
bles/03ROME4585_a.html 
32 Wikileaks, 04ROME1966, 20 May 2004, retrieved 11 April 2016, http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 
04ROME1966_a.html 
33 Wikileaks, 04THEHAGUE2138, 26 August 2004, retrieved 10 April 2016, http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 
04THEHAGUE2138_a.html  
34 F. Zanon, The High Representative for the CFSP and EU security culture: mediator or policy entrepreneur?, PhD 
Dissertation, University of Trento, 2012, pp. 124-126,  retrieved 29 April 2016, http://eprints-phd.biblio.unitn.it/785/  
35 Wikileaks, 04ROME3989, 15 October 2004, retrieved 11 Aril 2016, http://wikileaks.org/plusd/ca-
bles/04ROME3989_a.html; Telephone interview with EU official 1, 11 April 2016.    
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Cooperation Agreement (TCA) would depend on Iranian adherence to the ongoing bilateral dialogue 
on terrorism, human rights, the Middle East peace process and on cooperation with the IAEA.36  
Under the Tehran Declaration, the Iranians did take some positive steps, but their coop-
eration was ambiguous. In December 2003, the government voluntarily halted the manufacturing and 
assembling of gas centrifuges for six months. After this period had passed, it resumed the activities.37 
The IAEA criticized Iran for failing to provide full information on research activities, including on 
P-2 centrifuge drawings and experiments with polonium-210.38 According to the head of the Italian 
Disarmament Office, it was a “joke” to claim that these experiments were only for peaceful purposes, 
as polonium was used to for triggering an explosion.39 Moreover, Iran refused to bring enrichment 
activities to a complete halt and insisted on its right to operate 20 centrifuges for research purposes. 
According to EU officials, “significant carrots”, supported by the U.S., were needed in 
order for the Khatami administration to “save face” at home. They hoped for a G8 package of incen-
tives including “some kind of security guarantee”.40 However, such a package did not materialize. 
Instead the EU-3 went ahead and signed the Paris Agreement with Iran on 15 November 2004. The 
most important concession given in this deal was an EU-3 promise not to refer the case to the UNSC 
at the next BOG meeting.41 Moreover, the Iranian chief negotiator, Hassan Rouhani, insisted that 
cessation of enrichment should never be demanded again. The EU-3 agreed to this requirement stating 
                                                          
36 R. Beeston, ‘EU warns Iran nuclear program threatens trade: Ministers demand more inspection visits after uranium 
traces found at two sites’, Ottawa Citizen, 30 September 2003, section A, p. 14.   
37 House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: Iran: Fifth Report of Session 2007-08, London, 
House of Commons, 2008, p. 137.  
38 International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by Director General, GOV/2004/34, 18 June 2004.  
39 Wikileaks, 04ROME792, 2 March 2004, retrieved 11 April 2016, http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 
04ROME792_a.html 
40 Wikileaks, 04BRUSSELS4335, 8 October 2004, retrieved 11 April 2016, http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04BRUS-
SELS4335_a.html  
41 CNN, Iran agrees to suspend uranium enrichment, 15 November 2004, retrieved 12 April 2016, http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/11/14/iran.nuclear/  
12 
 
that a permanent suspension was not on the table. All they wanted was guarantees of the program’s 
peaceful nature.42  
In accordance with the Paris Agreement, Tehran ordered a complete halt of all nuclear 
activity including uranium enrichment, gas centrifuge manufacturing and separation of plutonium. 
Steps were also taken to provide full information and implementing corrective measures.43 Neverthe-
less, the initial optimism was soon replaced with intense discussions on guarantees of the program’s 
non-military nature. The agreement did not contain any clear definition of such a guarantee and 
thereby no clear benchmark for when the voluntary suspension could be lifted.44 The Iranians increas-
ingly felt like they were being manipulated without receiving anything in return for their efforts. 
Hassan Rouhani, complained that the EU-3 was “incapable of keeping promises”, such as aircraft 
sales and lifting U.S. objections to Iranian WTO membership.45  
The EU-3 had anticipated that they had insufficient leverage for their strategy of posi-
tive manipulation. For this reason, they tried to convince the U.S. of lifting its opposition to Iranian 
WTO membership.46 However, once the Bush administration finally agreed to these calls in March 
2005, the Khatami administration had come under heavy pressure from domestic hardline opposition 
                                                          
42 W. Van Kemenade, ‘Cooperation and competition on the Iran nuclear dispute: The role of the European Union and 
China’, in F.-P. Van der Putten & C. Shulong (eds.), China, Europe and International Security: Interests, Roles and 
Prospects, Oxon, Routledge, 2011, p. 141. 
43 Ibid.. ; International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by Director General, GOV/2005/67, 2 September 2005. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Wikileaks, 05PARIS1225, 25 February 2005, retrieved 11 April 2016, http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05PARIS1225 
_a.html 
46 Wikileaks, 05BRUSSELS212, 19 February 2005, retrieved 11 April 2016, http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05BRUS-
SELS212_a.html  
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and Ayatollah Khamenei. The Supreme Leader would not compromise on what he regarded as Iran´s 
legitimate right to conduct enrichment activities.47  
The dialogue between the EU-3 and Iran became even more difficult after the conserva-
tive hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became President. The EU-3 offered a new incentive package, 
but it did not include a consent to Iranian enrichment activities. Instead, Iran would have to stop fuel 
production activities for 10 years, use guaranteed imports of low-enriched uranium (LEU), and return 
spent nuclear fuel to the supplying countries.48 This offer was not sufficiently attractive for the Irani-
ans. They soon resumed uranium conversion, dropped the voluntary suspension of nuclear R&D ac-
tivities, and stopped the implementation of the Additional Protocol.49 
It was now finally clear to the Europeans that there was no real alternative to a UNSC 
referral, but they argued that the best course of action would be to refrain from imposing immediate 
sanctions.50 The U.S. eventually agreed to this advice.51 At the BOG meeting in February 2006, Iran 
was finally referred to the UNSC with an EU-drafted resolution supported by Russia and China.52 
This event marked the end of ‘constructive dialogue’ and the beginning of a phase with ‘E3+3’dis-
cussions (involving Iran, the EU, Germany, France, the UK, the U.S., China and Russia).  
  
                                                          
47 CNN, Iran: No Move towards Nuclear Arms, 13 March 2005, retrieved 7 October 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2005/WORLD/meast/03/12/us.iran/; Wikileaks, 05PARIS1834, 18 March 2005, retrieved 11 April 2016, http://wik-
ileaks.org/plusd/cables/05PARIS1834_a.html; S. H. Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, Brookings In-
stitution Press, 2012, ebook version, p. 171. 
48 Kaussler, op. cit., p. 43. 
49 Ibid. ; International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by Director General, GOV/2006/15, 27 February 2006. 
50 Wikileaks, 05PARIS6113, 9 September 2005, retrieved 12 April 2016, http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 
05PARIS6113_a.html  
51 N. Fathi, ‘Iran Faults Russian Nuclear Proposal but Offers to Keep Talking’, The New York Times, 28 January 2006, 
section A, p. 5.    
52 T. Sauer, ‘Coercive Diplomacy by the EU: The Case of Iran’, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute 
of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2007, p. 12. 
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3.4 Preliminary conclusions 
During this period, the EU was the main reason why it was possible to keep Iran en-
gaged in dialogue. No other actors were in a position to launch a diplomatic initiative at the time, and 
the U.S. was fixated on referring the case to the UNSC. Although the EU members respected the 
principle of consensus and generally favored outreach, some of them were very skeptic about the E3’s 
lead. The inclusion of Javier Solana served to keep internal coherence on the issue.  
In effect, Solana mostly acted as a facilitator between EU member states, the negotiating 
parties and Iran. While the E3 was successful in reaching the Tehran Declaration and the Paris Agree-
ment, they were cautious of losing leverage too quickly. At the same time, they needed full U.S. 
support of their strategy. Once the U.S. finally dropped its opposition to Iranian WTO membership 
in March 2005, the diplomatic window had narrowed. Hard-liners had gained a momentum in Iran 
and the nuclear program was perceived as an undeniable right under the NPT. 
4. 2006-2008: From positive to negative manipulation  
The change of venue from BOG to the UNSC marked a new phase in the diplomatic 
engagement with Iran. Initially the EU-3 attempted to assemble a new incentive package and facilitate 
a resumption of negotiations. However, as Iran declined, the American preference for ‘stickism’ grad-
ually took predominance in the international approach. By aligning itself closely with the U.S., the 
EU-3 could hardly be regarded as a neutral broker. Instead it followed the American lead and tried to 
force Iran back to the table with negative manipulation in the form of sanctions. By June 2008, the 
Iranian problem had only grown worse. Against this background, the EU-3 again tried to persuade 
Iran into dialogue with a UNSC-backed package of incentives. However, once more Iran would not 
accept the precondition of enrichment cessation.   
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4.1 Context 
The UNSC session on 29 March 2006 ended with a non-legally binding statement call-
ing on Iran to comply with past conditions before the end of April.53 Nevertheless, President Ahmad-
inejad soon announced that Iranian scientists successfully had enriched uranium to 3,5% U-235 and 
in June the IAEA was notified that a 5% level had been reached.54  
Tension between the West and Tehran grew over the summer as war broke out between 
the Iranian-backed Hezbollah organization and Israel in Southern Lebanon. Furthermore, Iran fought 
a proxy war against the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq that also contributed to cooling down relations.55 
Nevertheless, the Europeans were still inclined to find a diplomatic solution and received backing 
from the UNSC for a new incentive package to de-escalate the emerging conflict.  
There was apparently some uncertainty within the Iranian regime about how to respond 
to this proposal. The contrasting views may have reflected a deeper division between the Supreme 
National Security Council under the control of Ayatollah Khamenei and the Ahmadinejad govern-
ment. In June 2006, Khamenei appointed a five-man foreign policy council headed by the former 
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi. Its task was to ensure consistent macro foreign policy strategies.56  
Dutch diplomats suspected that Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and his staff had 
been sidelined.57 In the view of an Egyptian official, there were ideological and nationalistic reasons 
for the internal rifts in Iran. Enrichment had become a matter of national pride, regime survival and 
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international legitimacy.58 In October 2007, Iran’s lead negotiator Ali Larijani resigned due to “un-
solvable differences” with Ahmadinejad.59 The negotiations were now to be led by one of the Presi-
dent’s ideological allies – the former deputy foreign minister for European and American affairs, 
Saeed Jalili.60 
4.2 Coherence  
On 25 January 2006, the Political Director of the Italian MFA requested an urgent meet-
ing with the U.S. Ambassador to Rome. The purpose was to express Italy’s dissatisfaction with its 
role in the nuclear negotiations. The same day in COREPER, Italy had insisted that a draft commu-
nication on Iran would be made so to better reflect the views of all member states. The EU-3 had 
objected to this demand, and Italy responded by blocking the draft. Allegedly, the UK was the main 
opponent to including Italy in the Iran discussions.61 
While other EU members by now had accepted the EU-3’s lead, some of them remained 
skeptic about the level of transparency. According to the Czechs, the Council meetings on Iran merely 
had the form of simple briefings rather than an exchange of opinions.62 At the EU foreign ministers’ 
‘Gymnich meeting’ in 2006, several states, including the Netherlands, Spain, Greece and Italy, criti-
cized the E3 for a lack of transparency. This criticism was caused by the ‘big three’s’ failure to share 
Iran’s response to a negotiating proposal sponsored by the High Representative.63   
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In the face of continued Iranian enrichment activities, the Council of the EU was some-
what divided on where to draw a red line. Some of the countries that supported the U.S.’s hard ap-
proach were the UK, Czech Republic and Portugal. According to the Czech MFA Security Policy 
Director, Poland, the Netherlands and Slovakia also played assertive and constructive roles on the 
issue.64 Conversely, Germany and France represented a wing of countries that questioned the sense 
of preconditioning negotiations on Iranian cessation of enrichment activities.65 Despite these differ-
ences, the parties managed to find common ground on a set of UN resolutions that mandated eco-
nomic sanctions.   
In addition to the UN sanctions, the U.S. sought to convince its European allies of taking 
unilateral steps towards halting Iran’s access to export credit guarantees. Once again, some EU mem-
bers had reservations. Italy was cautious of upsetting its historically important business relations with 
Iran,66 the Netherlands wanted to avoid measures that would hit Shell,67 and Austria was worried of 
losing access to the Iranian energy sector. Nevertheless, the EU members gradually started to decrease 
their credit exposure to Iran.68 
4.3 Strategy and leverage 
The EU initially tried to persuade Iran with a strategy of manipulation through positive 
incentives. High Representative Solana stated that the EU would be ready to offer Iran “the most 
sophisticated technology” for energy purposes.69 Moreover, he emphasized that “we want to prove to 
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the Iranians clearly and loudly that we have nothing against Iran using nuclear power for peaceful 
means…[however,] we do not have proof that this is the case, and Iranian demands to be able to 
conduct enrichment for research purposes is something we can’t accept”.70  
Some of the elements in Solana’s May 2006 offer were a potential membership in the 
WTO, along with improved university ties to Europe and nuclear fuel supplies from an international 
entity in Russia. There was no formal deadline for the answer, but the Iranians stated that they would 
reply in August. It was an offer backed by all members of the UNSC and, most importantly, the 
Americans linked it to a request from President Ahmadinejad for direct talks with the U.S. Thus, if 
Iran replied positively to the proposal, Washington would be ready to accept Ahmadinejad’s invita-
tion.71  
The prospect of being able to speak directly with the Americans seems to have divided 
the Iranian decision-makers. While Foreign Minister Mottaki spoke positively of the package, lead 
negotiator Ali Larijani described it as “unacceptable” and “irrational”, since it was contingent on 
suspending enrichment.72 According to a Turkish diplomat, Larijani was losing his patience with the 
Europeans, whom he felt had cheated Iran.73 Thus, instead of accepting the offered terms, the regime 
responded with a lengthy counter proposal that did not provide for enrichment cessation.74  
On 31 July 2006, the UNSC adopted resolution 1696, which gave Iran one month to 
stop enrichment activities and meet the IAEA requirements or possibly face sanctions.75 As the dead-
line expired, Iran had neither suspended enrichment nor its ongoing construction of a heavy water 
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reactor. On request from IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei, Javier Solana undertook to 
maintain dialogue with Larijani. However, this attempt soon faltered. The U.S. had lost its patience 
with positive incentives and considered Larijani to be marginalized within the regime.76 With Lari-
jani’s resignation in October 2007, this assessment turned out to hold true. 
However, once more the U.S. preference for coercive diplomacy would be held back by 
its partners. French President Jacques Chirac tried to persuade George W. Bush to consider a three-
stage proposal. This plan would keep the enrichment question off the agenda until a dialogue with 
Iran had been established.77 In this way, Iran could be drawn back to the table and gradually led 
towards compliance.78   
However, while the U.S. stood firm on the precondition of enrichment suspension, Iran 
continued to defy the UNSC. This gradually led the E3 toward the position of the U.S. Thus, from 
December 2006 to March 2008, the UNSC adopted three resolutions (1737, 1747, 1803) leading to 
an embargo on nuclear-related trade, as well as sanctions on entities and individuals involved in the 
nuclear and ballistic missiles programme. In the first two resolutions, the great powers sought to 
protect their most significant national interests, such as arms exports and trade in oil and dual-use 
items.79 However, the third resolution did ban exports of dual-use items to Iran unless such items 
were intended for use in a light water reactor or to support cooperation with IAEA.80  
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Meanwhile, the EU had not given totally up on soft diplomacy, and Javier Solana con-
tinued to arrange meetings with Ali Larijani.81 Furthermore, the full E3+3 group invited Larijani to 
an informal meeting on the auspices of the UN General Assembly in New York. However, Larijani 
did not show up and resigned a few months later.82 Nevertheless, the EU managed to get support from 
the UNSC for a new updated package of incentives. A few of the key elements in the proposal were 
a recognition of Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program, technical and political cooperation as well 
as normalization of trade relations. Despite the long list of positive incentives, Iran declined the offer 
for the usual reason: the precondition of enrichment suspension was considered unacceptable.83    
4.4 Preliminary conclusions 
Despite new attempts by the EU-3 to give soft diplomacy a chance, Iran remained firm 
in its assertion that it had a right to enrich and process uranium under the NPT. For this reason, Tehran 
refused to negotiate based on a precondition of enrichment suspension. Within the EU, opinions var-
ied on whether to maintain the requirement of enrichment suspension. However, the U.S. was firm 
on this point and had support from a group of EU member states. Since the EU again failed to create 
sufficient leverage through positive incentives, negative manipulation with sanctions was the logical 
next step to take. 
Thus, gradually the E3+3 moved ahead with a sanctions-based approach. However, 
these sanctions allowed the parties to preserve some of their most sensitive trade interest. Although 
the U.S. pushed its European partners to go further with unilateral measures, Iran continued to de-
velop its nuclear program. Moreover, Tehran’s indirect involvement in the Iraq war and divisions 
within Iranian regime contributed to making rapprochement difficult. In sum, the EU-3 generally 
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followed the lead of the U.S. in this period. Javier Solana did try to bring the parties back to negotia-
tions but inflexible bargaining positions ultimately made it impossible to create progress.   
5. 2008-2012: Dual-track diplomacy 
As the George W. Bush era approached its end, the EU hoped for new impetus in the diplomatic 
engagement with Iran. However, the Obama administration’s ‘Dual-Track’ strategy created a para-
dox: Until this point, the EU-3 had struggled to facilitate reconciliation between the U.S. and Iran. 
However, now the UK and especially France voiced their opposition to American plans of abandon-
ing the former precondition of enrichment cessation. A renewed dialogue with Tehran led to several 
attempts to open formal negotiations. However, domestic pressure in Iran was again a contributing 
factor to a lack of significant progress. The Ahmadinejad administration was willing to talk but it 
needed quick, tangible concessions from the E3+3 to legitimize an opening of negotiations. The new 
Dual-Track strategy did not provide sufficient leverage in terms of attractive and early benefits that 
could help the Iranian government to save face at home.        
5.1 Context 
Despite several unsuccessful attempts at bringing Iran to the negotiating table, the EU-
3 awaited a new window of opportunity for diplomatic efforts. After a period shaped by uncompro-
mising political positions of the George W. Bush and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad administrations, it was 
expected that the upcoming presidential elections in the U.S. and Iran would have a fundamental 
impact on the prospects of rapprochement.   
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Initially this assessment seemed to hold true. The new U.S. President, Barack Obama, 
signaled his willingness to enter into a dialogue that would “not be advanced by threats” but by hon-
esty and “mutual respect”.84 However, contrary to expectations, Ahmadinejad managed to stay in 
power after a heavily disputed election. The allegations of fraud spurred the largest protests in Iran 
since the revolution and put Ahmadinejad under pressure to address the underlying dissatisfaction 
with the economy and corruption.85 This crisis of legitimacy helped pushing the Iranian government 
toward renewed negotiations with a view to achieve sanctions relief and international recognition.     
President Obama managed to launch a new dialogue by dropping the precondition of 
enrichment cessation. Nevertheless, getting to terms on an actual agreement turned out to be very 
difficult. One important reason was arguably the discourse in Iran. Several influential voices ham-
mered the approach for lacking guaranteed commitments from the E3+3 while demanding too big 
concessions from Iran.86 Rapprochement became even more difficult toward the end of this period. 
Tehran decided to cut diplomatic ties with the UK in response to sanctions on its financial institutions. 
The deterioration of relations with the UK led an angry crowd to attack the British Embassy in Tehran 
in November 2011.  
At the diplomatic level, the U.S.’ tried to push its European partners to adopt unilateral 
sanctions outside of the UNSC framework. Initially, there was some loose speculation on whether the 
EU’s treaty revision process would affect these efforts. According to EU Political Director Robert 
Cooper, the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty had led to discussions on a ‘multi-speed Europe’. It 
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was unclear whether such a principle would be legally possible to follow in the sphere of sanctions. 
Nevertheless, Cooper estimated that there were strong prospects of the EU moving ahead via a coa-
lition of the willing.87 Despite these speculations, the EU retained its consensus and erected a common 
embargo on Iranian oil in June 2012.88 
5.2 Coherence 
While awaiting the outcomes of the Presidential elections in 2008, the EU worked on 
implementing UNSC resolution 1803. However, the U.S. was not impressed with the pace of its part-
ners. In July 2008, an American official updated Washington on the transposition of sanctions that 
the U.S had urged the Europeans to implement for several months.89 At this point, the EU had only 
implemented parts of resolution 1803 and was likely to postpone further discussions on sanctions to 
a later Council meeting. The U.S. encouraged a quick transposition of the resolution and pressed for 
further autonomous measures, such as bans on exports credits and on investing in Iranian oil and 
gas.90  
The EU was particularly divided on the latter request. Austria kept referring to the stra-
tegic need of energy diversification, which had been illustrated by the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in 
2006.91 Moreover, Croatia and Poland had recently undertaken initiatives to develop natural gas re-
sources from Iran.92 According to the Political Director of the Portuguese MFA, the EU’s primary 
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concern was a spike in oil prices caused by a potential Israeli attack on Iran.93 Moreover, Germany 
insisted on agreement among all EU member states as well as several non-EU states with regard to 
sanctions.94 Against such concerns, the UK and France led a wing of member states that wanted to 
push forward with unilateral sanctions. These divisions among the big member states complicated the 
prospects of them forming a united ‘coalition of the willing’.95 
Despite the change of U.S. administrations, the sanctions policy continued under Pres-
ident Obama. In 2009, Washington proposed the adoption of a new set of UN-mandated sanctions. 
Once more, some EU members expressed their concern over this policy. According to Swedish For-
eign Minister Carl Bildt, sanctions were an ineffective tool. They would be impossible to enforce in 
the energy sector and possible to bypass in the financial sector.96 However, Sweden evidently had 
significant economic interests at stake. According to the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden had 
doubled its exports to Iran while other EU members were cutting back.97 Nevertheless, the Europeans 
did manage to overcome their contrasting views and found common ground on tightening the screw.  
5.3 Strategy and leverage 
The Obama strategy seemed much like old wine in a new bottle. Even its label, ‘dual-
track diplomacy’, had sometimes been used by diplomats to describe the approach under President 
                                                          
93 Wikileaks, 08LISBON1655, 11 July 2008, retrieved 18 April 2016, http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08LIS-
BON1655_a.html  
94 Wikileaks, 08LONDON2600, 14 October 2008, 18 April 2016, http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08LON-
DON2600_a.html  
95 Kaussler, op. cit., p. 72. 
96 C. Bildt cited in Wikileaks, 09STOCKHOLM738, 25 November 2009, retrieved 18 April 2016, http://wik-
ileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STOCKHOLM738_a.html  
97 Wikileaks, 09STOCKHOLM793, 22 December 2009, retrieved 18 April 2016, http://wikileaks.org/plusd/ca-
bles/09STOCKHOLM793_a.html  
25 
 
Bush.98 As in the past, this strategy implied a mixture of outreach on one hand and continuous sanc-
tions on the other one. However, the strategy did contain two important elements. First, enrichment 
suspension would no longer be a precondition for engaging in confidence-building steps but would 
feature at a later stage in the diplomatic process. Secondly, the negotiations would focus strictly on 
the nuclear program and leave out issues such as human rights and regional stabilization.99  
Paradoxically, now that the U.S. finally was ready to drop the precondition of enrich-
ment cessation, the UK and France wanted to stay with the red line from the Bush era.100 French 
foreign minister Bernard Kouchner cautioned that too much reliance on soft dialogue over sanctions 
could “ruin the dual-track approach”.101 Even after the successful launch of new talks with Iran in 
October 2009, France remained skeptic of the strategy. The French MFA Deputy Director for Strate-
gic Affairs even conveyed to his American counterparts that France was waiting for the U.S. to take 
leadership on Iran.102  
Tehran accepted the offer to engage in talks without preconditions. However, once more 
it turned out that Iran was working on a secret facility. An underground enrichment plant was being 
constructed below a military base near the city of Qom; the Americans later claimed that they had 
known about the existence of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. Allegedly, the U.S. had been wait-
ing for the right time to use this intelligence as a bargaining chip. However, the Iranians moved first 
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by declaring the existence of the plant to the IAEA. They claimed that the purpose of the facility had 
been to shield the nuclear program from a possible military strike by the U.S. or Israel.103   
Nevertheless, in October 2009, the parties agreed on a deal whereby Iran would ship 
75% of its LEU to Russia. It would then be enriched to below weapons grade level before being 
converted to fuel in France. Finally, the fuel would be returned to Iran for use in a research reactor.104 
The EU would be responsible for facilitating the next steps by setting up a specific agenda together 
with the Iranians. To this end, Solana’s Personal Representative for non-proliferation of WMD, An-
nalisa Giannella, and Robert Cooper met with Deputy Secretary of the Supreme National Security 
Council Ali Bagheri in Geneva.105  
However, the Geneva plan was not popular among several influential voices in Iran. 
Critics argued that Iran would be giving away more LEU than the amount of fuel it would receive in 
return after a long waiting period of one-two years.106 As a result, Tehran started to roll back on the 
agreement. As the outreach track was entering a stalemate, the U.S. shifted its focus to sanctions by 
pushing for a new UNSC resolution. 
The West’s renewed focus on coercion opened the outreach track to other actors. Sur-
prisingly, Turkey and Brazil launched joined talks with Iran in spring 2010. The three parties found 
common ground on a proposal whereby Iran would deposit 1,200 kg LEU in Turkey and receive 120 
kg of 20% enriched fuel in return. However, the U.S. and the EU-3 dismissed the proposal for both 
technical and political reasons. The framework did not take into account that Iran’s LEU stockpile 
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had increased since Geneva. At the same time, it would not prevent Iran from producing more.107 In 
addition, the U.S., the UK and France worried that the Turkish-Brazilian intervention would compli-
cate the adoption of a new UNSC resolution. However, resolution 1929 did pass, and this effectively 
marked the breakdown of the Turkish-Brazilian initiative.108  
Interestingly, UNSC resolution 1929 explicitly recognized the key role of the EU’s new 
High Representative Catherine Ashton to, 
...continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic 
efforts to find a negotiated solution, including relevant proposals by China, 
France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the 
United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks.109 
Thus, the HR now had a formal mandate to act in a facilitating / formulating role. Throughout 2011-
2012, Ashton engaged in bilateral discussions with Saeed Jalili in which they tried to find common 
ground on a new version of the fuel swap proposal. To this end, the parties met in Istanbul, Baghdad 
and Moscow.  
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov presented a ‘step-by-step’ plan implying re-
ciprocal confidence-building actions to verify the peaceful nature of Iran’s program. The final aim 
would be to allow for small-scale enrichment under international supervision.110 Although Tehran 
accepted this approach, the parties could not agree on a specific ‘package’ allowing Iran to save face 
while guaranteeing the peaceful nature of the nuclear programme. In the meantime, Iran began to 
enrich uranium to 20% (HEU level).111 
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Tehran wanted sanctions relief and a recognized right to enrich as a precondition for 
negotiating. These demands were against the dual-track strategy of pressuring Iran with sanctions 
during the bargaining phase. At the same time, enrichment was to be suspended in the phase of “se-
rious negotiations”.112 Once more, the dialogue stalled due to Presidential elections in the U.S.   
5.4 Preliminary conclusions 
Obama’s ‘dual-track strategy’ was meant to give impetus to soft diplomacy. However, 
at the same time, the second track implied negative manipulation with sanctions to pressure Iran into 
compliance. Paradoxically, inside the EU, the UK and France now argued in favour of a hardline 
approach while some other member states were highly skeptical of sanctions. Nevertheless, they did 
not want to break the EU’s principle of consensus and agreed to erect an embargo on .Iranian oil.  
In the last part of this period, the new High Representative, Catherine Ashton, tried to 
create a breakthrough. She acted in the nexus between facilitation and formulation by discussing on 
the basis of pre-agreed positions. Hard-pressed in the domestic arena, the Ahmadinejad administra-
tion needed a compromise that would allow it to save face at home. However, the dual-track principles 
did not provide the necessary room to give such concessions. 
6. 2012-2015: The end game 
The election of the new Reformist president Hassan Rouhani, marked a turning point in the E3+3 
talks with Iran. This event combined with secret back channel talks between American and Iranian 
officials created the basis for launching formal negotiations. The result was a compromise on an 
interim framework agreement (the JPOA) and further negotiations on a long-term settlement of the 
dispute culminating with the JCPOA in July 2015. The intensified talks increased the need for effec-
tive coordination and communication. To this end the High Representative and her team played a key 
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role in maintaining continuity via facilitation and formulation. Within the E3, France continued to 
pursue a hard line. While it is difficult to assess the precise impact of this bargaining position, it does 
not seem to have endangered the overall progress towards a final deal.  
6.1 Context  
Within Iran, the extensive sanctions had taken their toll. In August 2013, inflation stood 
at 45% up from 32% earlier in the summer, oil exports had decreased by more than 40% compared 
to the previous year, and foreign currency holdings were shrinking at a rate of $15 billion per year.113 
Public debt had not been served for more than half a year.114 During the presidential elections in June 
2013, the Reformists used the deteriorating economic climate as a main argument for reopening the 
nuclear negotiations. This tactic helped bringing about the victory of Iran’s former lead negotiator, 
Hassan Rouhani.115  
With the confrontational Ahmadinejad out of office and Barack Obama beginning his 
second Presidential term, “all the stars were now finally aligned” for new attempts to make a break-
through.116 Previous constellations of leaders had largely negated what the EU-3 could do.117 Rouhani 
started out by signaling his willingness to bring the nuclear negotiations forward. Moreover, he trans-
ferred the responsibility of the negotiations from the conservative National Security Council and back 
to the MFA and appointed moderate allies to administrative key positions. The Foreign Minister Ja-
vad Zarif became the new lead negotiator.118 
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In fact, it only took a few months from Rouhani’s inauguration until a landmark ‘interim 
agreement’ had been reached which provided a framework for renewed formal negotiations. How-
ever, it was later revealed that significant ground had been covered in secret bilateral meetings be-
tween the U.S. and Iran in Oman during the Ahmadinejad years. From 2011, these contacts took place 
at lower political levels, but they turned into high-level discussions by March 2013 when delegations 
headed by the two Deputy Foreign Ministers William Burns and Ali Asghar Khaji met in the Omani 
capital, Muscat.119 
Apparently, these highly secretive meetings took place without the knowledge of the 
U.S.’ partners, including the ‘lead negotiator’ Catherine Ashton. It was during these bilateral meet-
ings that a common understanding was reached that resulted in the U.S. accepting Iranian enrichment 
capacity. In June 2013, right before the election of Rouhani, the two parties met for a third round of 
discussions where they drafted a framework for formal negotiations.120 This compromise formed the 
basis for later meetings in Vienna and Geneva culminating with an interim agreement.  
6.2 Coherence 
According to EU officials, there was a remarkable degree of unity within the E3+3 de-
spite the Russian annexation of Crimea in early 2014.121 Nevertheless, upon learning of the secret 
backchannel in Oman, France’s Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius was clearly displeased about having 
been left out. Moreover, he complained that the U.S-Iranian bargaining proposal was weak on issues 
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such as the heavy water reactor in Arak, the acceptance of enrichment, and an offer to unfreeze Iranian 
assets in foreign banks.122  
This tough stance was also evident during the ensuing negotiations. For example, 
France bargained for an agreement which would ensure a breakout time (the estimated time that Iran 
would need to develop a nuclear weapon) of 12 months for a period of 15 years.123 Conversely, the 
U.S. was ready to accept a 12-month breakout time to remain in place for a minimum of 10 years. 
According to Fabius, France wanted stricter targets concerning the “volume, checks and duration of 
the envisaged commitments”.124 His views suggest that France was taking a more tough stance than 
its European partners due to a mixture of national pride and relations with Gulf States and Israel.125 
6.3 Strategy and leverage 
Contrary to the expectations of many observers, it seemed like the sanctions part of 
‘dual-track diplomacy’ had succeeded in creating leverage for the second track of dialogue. Accord-
ing to an EU official, it was the European sanctions that made the difference. After all, American 
trade with Iran had already been severely limited for decades.126  
However, at the negotiating table, it was Russia and not Europe that came up with the 
fundamental idea behind the new framework for negotiations. More specifically, the parties discussed 
different versions of Sergey Lavrov’s ‘step-by-step plan’, both prior to and after the elections in the 
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U.S. and Iran. Two unsuccessful meetings took place in Kazakhstan during spring 2013 before the 
election of Rouhani turned things around.127  
A new round of talks in Geneva led to an interim agreement called the Joint Plan of 
Action (JPOA) being reached on 24 November 2013. This framework made it possible to move be-
yond the stage of dialogue and into regular negotiations. Similar to the Lavrov Plan, this document 
stated that the parties, while negotiating a long-term solution, would undertake a number of reciprocal 
steps during two phases.  
The first six-month phase would be extendable by mutual consent. Iran would commit 
to freeze building and enrichment activities and cooperate fully with the IAEA. In return, the E3+3 
would suspend existing sanctions on gold, precious metals, petrochemicals and the auto industry, 
refrain from imposing new sanctions, and facilitate trade in food and medicine.128 After no more than 
one year, the second phase should begin, during which a negotiated long-term solution would start 
being implemented.  
Such a solution would include: a specification of the duration of the deal; a definition 
of the scope of enrichment; resolution of concerns about Iran’s heavy water reactor; cooperation on 
a civilian nuclear program; implementation of transparency measures, including the Additional Pro-
tocol; and a comprehensive lift of remaining nuclear-related sanctions. In addition, the Europeans 
would keep a close eye on implementation of near-term measures via a joint EU-3 + Iran committee 
for monitoring and dispute settlement.129  
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The JPOA marked the beginning of the most intense period of diplomatic engagement 
with Iran. The negotiating parties met in all kinds of different formats such as bilaterals, trilaterals 
and full group plenaries.130 The EU team, led by the High Representative, was at the center of all 
these meetings. Catherine Ashton and later Federica Mogherini chaired the main Foreign Ministers 
meetings, while Deputy Secretary General of EEAS Helga Schmidt led talks between the political 
directors. Two EEAS Senior Advisors coordinated technical discussions at expert level.131 The spe-
cific role of the EU was to keep continuity between the different discussion levels, take note of all 
the inputs, and “make sure that everything was put together and mediated”.132  
Thus, the EU’s responsibility was not merely to facilitate meetings and act as channel 
of communication. It also had a more active role that entailed to formulate various drafts and com-
promise proposals.133 In 2015 alone, the meeting activity exceeded 120 days. According to an EU 
official, the high meeting frequency, the relatively small negotiating teams and their rather stable 
composition generated a sense of confidentiality. This helps to explain why no documents leaked, in 
spite of the fact that many papers were floating around.134  
Catherine Ashton has been described as a skillful diplomat in the talks with Iran.135 
According to Professor Ali Bigdeli from Tehran’s Beheshti University, Ashton was “the most suitable 
individual as far as Iran’s nuclear case is concerned”.136 She managed to be perceived as a credible 
mediator who was “able to act more impartially than other Western officials”; this is not least the 
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case because the EU never threatened to use the military option.137 However, since Ashton’s mandate 
was to act in the nexus between facilitation and formulation, her limits were also very clear as de-
scribed by an Iranian official,  
She knows how to create a pleasant and practical atmosphere … [But] 
it’s quite clear that there is no genuine political power behind her. She 
has to go to consult with the representatives of the world powers on 
every minor detail […] She is no more than a liaison, and at that she is 
very effective.138 
 
Due the expertise and confidence she had had built with the Iranians throughout her 
years in office, Ashton continued to act as a special advisor to her successor, Federica Mogherini.139  
The negotiations were very complex because the goal of ensuring the peaceful nature 
of the Iranian program could be reached through different paths. Various elements could be adjusted 
in different ways and combinations that had to be checked for viability and impact.140 Iran wanted to 
be able use its heavy water reactor and have sanctions phased-out.141 Conversely, for the U.S., the 
critical point was to limit Iran’s ‘breakout time’ (the time it would take for Iran to develop a nuclear 
weapon) to at least one year.142 By June 2015, the breakout time was estimated to just around two 
months.143 In addition, the talks centered on formulating a ‘snap-back’ mechanism for reactivating 
sanctions in case of violations.144      
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Given the complexity of the discussions, it was necessary to extend the duration of the 
JPOA twice. Eventually, the parties decided to split up the political and technical negotiations. After 
additional rounds of hard bargaining, the JCPOA was finally reached within an extended deadline in 
July 2015.145 Among other things, the agreement stipulates that Iran has to reduce its number of 
centrifuges by two-thirds and provide enhanced access to IAEA inspectors for 20 years. Enrichment 
will be restricted to a maximum level of 3,67% for 15 years, and the LEU stockpile has to be reduced 
by 98%.146  
In return, the nuclear-related multilateral sanctions and the EU’s economic, financial 
and energy-related sanctions, including on oil, were lifted on 16 January 2016 (Implementation Day). 
Additional relief will be given in 2023 (Transition Day) and in 2025 (Termination Day) at the latest, 
provided that Iran continues to fulfill its obligations.147    
 
7. Conclusions 
The EU’s ability to influence the process was indeed moderated by changing conditions for diplo-
macy in the form of context, leverage, strategy, and coherence. In the beginning, the Europeans man-
aged to keep Iran at the table and prevented the situation from escalating. This was important at a 
time when President George W. Bush had declared Iran to be part of an ‘axis of evil’ and the U.S. 
had invaded neighboring Iraq.  
However, the EU had insufficient leverage from the beginning of the process, which 
partly was due to the U.S.’ hesitation to support packages of incentives. Meanwhile the Iranians grew 
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impatient and criticized the lack of direct reciprocity in the dialogue with the Europeans. Neverthe-
less, the EU’s leverage was also insufficient because the Iranian interest in enrichment capacity out-
ranked the uncertain perspectives of concluding a TCA and becoming a WTO member. Thus, the 
strategy of positive manipulation based on the ‘Constructive Dialogue’ did not alter the Iranian cost-
benefit calculations sufficiently. This frustrated the Europeans and led them to support sanctions in 
the UNSC.  
Interestingly, once the U.S. finally presented a strategy that would make it easier to 
enter into dialogue with Tehran, France and the UK did not want to abolish the old red line of enrich-
ment suspension. Thus, the European commitment to sustain dialogue was ambiguous. Within the 
EU, there were some friction over the lead of the E3. Nevertheless, the principle of consensus served 
to keep a fundamental coherence on the policy toward Iran. 
After some years, the impact of the European sanctions did provide much-needed lev-
erage for the E3+3. At the same time, the election of Hassan Rouhani created a window of opportunity 
for negotiations. However, the evidence does not support the hypothesis. Even when the four indica-
tors created a favorable diplomatic climate, the EU did not provide the main impetus to move forward. 
Secret bilateral meetings between the U.S. and Iran created an opening for diplomacy and the general 
negotiating approach was based on a Russian framework proposal.  
One can claim that the European sanctions were one of the main reasons why it was 
possible to make a diplomatic breakthrough. However, the sanctions were to a wide extent initiated 
by the U.S. and erected under American guidance and pressure. Nevertheless, EU’s role was still 
significant. The High Representative and her team had the vital responsibility of facilitating continu-
ity between the different negotiating levels and formulating compromise proposals.   
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In conclusion, although the EU played an important role, it was not ‘the main reason’ 
why it was possible to reach the JCPOA. Nevertheless, the diplomatic process illustrates that a UNSC 
format with the EU High Representative, as a facilitator and formulator, may be a promising way to 
address international disputes in the future. Such a mediating role is consistent with the EU’s image 
as a peaceful, credible actor and could help it filling out a niche at the highest level in global politics.  
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